Essay
They Talk About Me, and I Refuse to Talk About Them
On a good rule in the wrong place
I am 40 and I study psychology in a program for working adults. There, the confession, right up front, so nobody can charge me for it later.
What I did not expect was this: the classroom turned out to be just as relaxed and cheerful as a room full of 19-year-olds. The jokes, the mess, the not-so-elegant lateness. That is what I saw, so it goes down as what it is, an impression, nothing more. And it is refreshing. It breaks the monotony of a life of work, bills and obligations. I say it without shame.
But education is education, and the dynamics are the same regardless of age. That is no longer an impression, it is a claim, and claims have to be gone after. I went. It turns out there is a whole theory, Knowles's andragogy, which says adults learn differently. And it also turns out that Rachal, after reviewing thirty years of studies on that theory, concludes the evidence remains inconclusive; he calls it a fragmented article of faith. So: the theory contradicts me, and the theory does not quite hold up either. And even if it did, I would dig in. I know that is exactly what I criticize further down. I dig in anyway: the same dynamic landed on me as on the 19-year-olds. I am not trying to psychoanalyze anyone in my classroom. Just to record how good a time I am having.
With those dynamics come the others, the ones every human society has had since there was fire. A serious anthropologist would call them vocal grooming, which is more or less how Dunbar explained gossip: what primates do by picking lice off each other, we do by talking about someone else. Two thirds of what we talk about, by his count, is that. We, the good students, call it classroom gossip.
So I start with the gossip.
They say of me that I am not very empathetic. Not very kind either. They say it in the classroom, sometimes quietly and sometimes not so much. That I should never have studied psychology but engineering. That I always think I am right, and that one, I admit, I did not learn from books: sometimes the best answer is a "well, you are probably right" or a "huh?", and that is enough to settle an argument. At the height of the excesses I was called histrionic and narcissistic. Diagnosis and all. My inner replies, if I said them out loud, would keep me from getting my degree or send me straight to hell. So, dear reader, a piece of advice: enjoy the privacy agreement and the seal of confession. Blessed be both.
And I must admit that sometimes I earn it the hard way. The best proof I gave myself, with the whiteboard as witness.
They ran an activity with sums, subtractions, multiplications and divisions. The idea, I suppose, was something else: break the ice, work in groups, lose the shyness. I, out of pure unpleasantness, walked up to the board with the rule for combined operations. Parentheses first, then multiply and divide, add and subtract last. When they asked what we had learned from the activity, I answered that they should go learn their eight times table and study maths again.
The rule was correct. That was the worst part: nobody had asked me for it.
And one more confession, which costs me. On this very site there is a section called Dinámicas. The one who mocked the activity now designs them. Life has its sense of humor, and mine is not always up to it.
I understand them. I have my opinions of them too, and they are not few. Opinions, not diagnoses, and you will not read them here. In "The brain that predicts" I told how the brain cannot rebuild the world from scratch every time it opens its eyes, so it predicts with what it has already lived. With people it is the same. We cannot get to know each person from scratch, so we guess them from the little we saw: a sentence in class, a face at the board, an unpleasant reply. And done. We already know who they are.
And it is not only laypeople who do it. When clinicians were observed in consultation, they generated on average four diagnostic hypotheses in the first five minutes, and only afterwards asked questions to test them (Elstein and colleagues, as cited by Carlat). Four in five minutes. That is not a flaw; it is what an expert does. Having an opinion in advance is no sin. It is what a brain does when it has neither the time nor the budget to interview everyone.
The problem is elsewhere. In my case, at the whiteboard.
Back to the rule. It is correct, it is taught at school, and whoever ignores it in an exam gets it wrong. But that was not an exam. It was a group activity, and an activity is measured with another yardstick: whether the group moved, whether someone who never spoke spoke, whether people got up from their chairs. By that yardstick, the one who failed was me.
Kahneman and Klein, who came to the topic of intuition from opposite camps, ended up agreeing on something: a quick judgment deserves trust when it was formed in an environment with valid regularities, and with practice that feeds the error back. My mathematical judgment was formed on different ground. In the classroom of a group activity it was worth nothing, and I used it as if it were worth everything. It is the same thing that happened to me with the napkin and Newton's clock in the previous essay: a good rule, outside its scale, stops seeing what is in front of it.
And there is something worse, which took me a while to see. Social psychologists call it the fundamental attribution error: when explaining what someone else does, we inflate their character and shrink the situation. My classmates "don't know maths"; it did not occur to me that the activity was not a maths exam. And with myself I did the opposite, which also has a name, the actor-observer effect: I "was bored", "the activity was weak", "someone had to say it". That effect, by the way, is more fragile than its fame suggests. Malle reviewed 173 studies and, overall, it barely shows up. But it does show up when what has to be explained is something bad. Mine was. For them, character; for me, circumstances. They say what I am; about them, I keep quiet, but I think it all the same. And neither of us looks at the situation.
There is a figure that kept me thinking for several days. When raters score concrete behaviors, with explicit criteria, their own bias explains about 4% of the variance in the ratings. When they score global traits, about 47% (Hoyt and Kerns, as cited by Lösel and Schmucker). They are raters, not classmates, and carrying it this far is my own reading. But look at the pattern. "He went up to the board and said the thing about the eight times table" is a behavior. "He is not very empathetic" is a trait. And what I thought of them, "they don't know maths", is one too. In both directions, almost half of what gets said speaks of the one who is looking.
An opinion you keep to yourself is a prior: it may be wrong, but it costs mostly you. An opinion said out loud, in front of everyone, is something else. My reading is this: it stops being a prediction and becomes a social fact. The other person hears it, carries it, and sometimes believes it. Rosenthal and Jacobson popularized the idea that what a teacher expects of his students can change how they do. The effect turned out more modest and more contested than its fame suggests, but the underlying intuition holds: what you expect of someone, if you tell them, also acts.
Someone who read "The uncomfortable room" is going to call me out here. There I defended hard criticism: an opinion without support does not count as an answer. So where do we stand? We stand here. My rule had support, but support also has a domain. Criticizing an argument with grounds is craft. Dropping a judgment on people, with grounds that belong to another field, looks like being right. But it is not.
This is learned in the first class. The psychologist forms an impression from the moment the person walks through the door: how they greet, how they sit, what they leave unsaid. That impression is a working hypothesis, and it is kept. It is not announced, it is not handed back as a verdict, it is tested session after session. Having it is part of the job. Saying it outright is a professional error.
And there is something simpler still. We do not all tolerate criticism the same way. Some receive it as information and some receive it as a blow, and you almost never know in advance who is who. Changing that is not our job. Our job is to understand it and, if the other person asks, to give them tools to do something with what they hear. In the classroom I am nobody's psychologist. But the classroom is where the psychologist trains, and that day, with the eight times table, I trained exactly the opposite.
The other failure is quieter. An opinion that is never discussed is a prior that is never updated. Bayes without evidence. I believe the same after looking as before looking, because I did not really look.
The assessment literature gives it a name: confirmatory testing strategy (De Bruyn). The problem is not having the hypothesis; the five-minute clinicians have it. The problem is the next step, when the questions are chosen to confirm the preferred hypothesis and not to rule out the others. And an uncomfortable detail: a shared bias does not produce disagreement, it produces agreement (Lösel and Schmucker). That several people say the same thing about someone does not prove they saw them well. It holds for what they say about me. And it holds, unfortunately, for what I think of them.
And here it is my turn. What are they right about? Quite a lot. Accepting a person is not agreeing with them on everything, I have said it and I stand by it, but that does not excuse me from kindness, which is cheaper and almost always enough. When I answered the thing about the eight times table I was not defending rigor. I was winning an argument nobody had started.
The uncomfortable question is double. What would I have to see to change my opinion of them? And what evidence have I given them to change theirs of me? The second one costs me more. The honest answer is: little.
They say of me that I am not very empathetic. I told them to learn their eight times table. We both formed our opinions fast, and that is not the serious part; the brain is built for that. Will either of us take the trouble to check?
I was thinking about the reason for this website, and at times it looks like a blog devoted to feeding the ego of this, its only servant for now. I do not want that to be the only impression, because there is some truth to the ego part. What I want is for whoever reads this, whoever is thinking of studying whatever it may be as an adult, to know that it is more fun than it looks. That it is a permanent exercise in living together, in tolerance and, above all, in beautiful sarcasm, fine irony and, at times, in pure adolescent survival past 30. If you are thinking about the second career, or the first, do it. You research, you cite, and you have a good time, as we do here, in our strange way.
And if those friends, some of whom will be colleagues, with their coffees, their beers, their laughter and their parties that start at noon and end at six in the evening, are not today as sacred as our most accurate literature, they should be. Enjoy it with them. And, why not, also with the ones who say things about you. Who knows, you might be in for a surprise.
Translated from the Spanish original.
Sources
- Carlat, D. J. (2023). La entrevista psiquiátrica y el examen mental (5th ed.). Wolters Kluwer Health.
- De Bruyn, E. E. J. (2003). Assessment process. In R. Fernández-Ballesteros (Ed.), Encyclopedia of psychological assessment (pp. 93–97). SAGE.
- Dunbar, R. I. M. (2004). Gossip in evolutionary perspective. Review of General Psychology, 8(2), 100–110. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.8.2.100
- Jussim, L., & Harber, K. D. (2005). Teacher expectations and self-fulfilling prophecies: Knowns and unknowns, resolved and unresolved controversies. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 9(2), 131–155. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0902_3
- Kahneman, D., & Klein, G. (2009). Conditions for intuitive expertise: A failure to disagree. American Psychologist, 64(6), 515–526. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016755
- Lösel, F., & Schmucker, M. (2003). Assessor's bias. In R. Fernández-Ballesteros (Ed.), Encyclopedia of psychological assessment (pp. 98–101). SAGE.
- Malle, B. F. (2006). The actor-observer asymmetry in attribution: A (surprising) meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 132(6), 895–919. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.132.6.895
- Rachal, J. R. (2002). Andragogy's detectives: A critique of the present and a proposal for the future. Adult Education Quarterly, 52(3), 210–227. https://doi.org/10.1177/0741713602052003004
- Ravello Joo, C. E. (2026). El cerebro que predice. Researching Mind. https://researchingmind.com/pensamientos/el-cerebro-paga-dos-facturas-es
- Ravello Joo, C. E. (2026). La habitación incómoda. Researching Mind. https://researchingmind.com/pensamientos/la-habitacion-incomoda-es
- Ravello Joo, C. E. (2026). Las escalas importan. Researching Mind. https://researchingmind.com/pensamientos/las-escalas-importan-es
- Rosenthal, R., & Jacobson, L. (1968). Pygmalion in the classroom. The Urban Review, 3(1), 16–20. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02322211
- Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 10, 173–220. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60357-3
Every claim in this essay was read at its source; the verification file records the source, the original wording and how it was checked. Elstein and colleagues and Hoyt and Kerns are secondary citations: they were read in Carlat and in Lösel and Schmucker, not in the original. What is marked as my reading is the author’s inference. What they say about me is testimony, not data.